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How  does perception  relate to agency?  The  classical  pragmatist thesis is that
only an agent can perceive. I will  interpret  this as  the claim that the ability  to
have perceptions of  an objective  world  depends on  the  ability  to  perform
bodily  actions.  This is a claim that one can approach from two points of view :
the third-person point  of  view  and the  first-person point  of  view  that we
have of ourselves. From the third -person point  of view, the claim is that one
cannot suppose a being to enjoy perceptions of an objective  world  without
incurring  a commitment  to accept that the being, whatever it is, is also capable 
of bodily  action.  The  shift to the first-person point  of view  involves the
application  of this hypothesis to oneself, and acceptance of this application  is
already implied  by acceptance of the original  third -person hypothesis. But  I
think  one can also regard the first-person hypothesis as  asking for a rather different 
kind  of argument. For where the third -person hypothesis implies the
existence of a necessary  connection  between perception and action, without
any special constraints on the considerations that can be introduced  to support 
it, the adoption  of  a first-person point  of view  is standardly associated
with  an epistemological  perspective that introduces  the constraint  that one
should not appeal to facts that transcend subjective appearances .  Whether  this
is really a coherent project is, of course, much disputed, but in this context  it
suggests  the possibility of substantiating, within  an account of the contents of
perception and action, the necessary  connection  between perception and action 
that the third -person hypothesis posits 
"from  the outside." This, at any
rate, is how  I will  interpret  the first-person hypothesis, and since the arguments 
I advance  in support of both the third -person and the first-person sup-
positions are not just  variants of  each other, I will  return  at the end of this
paper to the question of the relationship between the two lines of argument.
First and rather briefly, the third -person issue: can one suppose that x enjoys
objective perceptions (perceptions that represent to x -objective features of x's
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1  The  Pragmatist  Argumentenvironment ) without  supposing that x is an agent? I think  not.  The  mediating 
concept  to  bring  out  the connection  here is that of belief: on  the one
hand, a necessary  feature of perceptions is that they provide grounds for beliefs
; on the other hand, beliefs dispose  to action.  The first point  here does not
require the strong claim that perceptions just  are beliefs, or even presumptive
beliefs; it  only  requires the  thesis that perception  could  not  have objective
representational content unless  it were part of a cognitive system  in which  the
contents of perception were treated as prima  facie believable.  The  reason for
this is that in assigning objective content  to a perception , we think  of it as a
representation for the subject of features  of its environment , and to think  of it
as  such is precisely to think  of the role of the perception in the subject
's cognitive 
economy. Once  one abstracts  from  this role, one is left  with  the conception 
of perceptions as  just  sensory states  with  qualities that are correlated
with  features  of the environment  that give rise to them. But from this kind  of
causal  correlation  alone one cannot get a conception  of these sensory states  as
representations of these features for  a subject. Without  an acknowledgment
of their  potential  cognitive  role, they are as nonintentional , as con tentless, as
the rings on a tree whose width  covaries with  the type of weather endured
by the tree.
The  second stage in  this  argument  concerned  the  connection  between 
belief  and agency, and the argument  here largely continues  the previous 
point . The  argument  goes as follows : To  think  of  a being  as having
the belief  that such and such requires one to think  of the being as ready to
act as if  such and such. Beliefs  considered  in  abstraction  from  action  can
only  be individuated  causally, and, quite  apart from  the difficulty  in understanding 
how  this  is to  apply  to  beliefs concerning  the  future , this causal
individuation  will  not  provide  the basis  for  an intentional  characterization
of  them . This  can only  come  through  the  use the subject  makes of  them
and must ultimately  rest on their  role in  the causation of action .  This  is, of
course, the  claim  of  the  pragmatist  theory  of  belief , according  to  which
the  content  of  a belief  can be defined  in  terms  of  its role  in  helping  to
bring  about actions that would  satisfy the subject
's desires if the belief  were
true.! But just  as there was no need before to interpret  perceptions  as beliefs
, so there  is no  need here to  subscribe to  the  full  pragmatist  theory,
which , by itself, appears to provide  an account  of the content  of belief  that
is altogether  too  extensional . To  obtain  a more  satisfactory  account , one
needs, I think , to  introduce  both  causal considerations  and an account  of
the conceptual  structure  of  belief , but  these matters need not  concern  us
here. For all that is required  here is the fundamental  insight  of the pragmatists 
that beliefs are essentially states whose contents  enter  into  the explanation 
of actions caused by them .
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suppose that a being has perceptions of an objective  world  without
supposing that the being is capable of bodily  action . One can then apply this
conclusion  directly  to oneself, but, as I indicated  above, one can also argue
for  this first-person thesis in  a different  way. The  starting  point  here is the
abstract conception  of oneself as a subject of  experience, and the question
one can then put to oneself is,  What  does one need to assume  about oneself
to legitimate  the thought  that one's experiences are experiences of an objective 
world . This  is, of  course, a  starting  point  that  is  at  least as old  as
Descartes, and there are many  responses  to  it, including  a denial  that  the
starting point  is coherent.2 But  I will  set aside doubts on  this last score so
that I can concentrate on the hypothesis that to know  oneself to be a subject
of objective experience, one must experience oneself as  an agent.
A  useful  introduction  to  this  thesis, in  the  kind  of  dialectical  situation 
with  which  I am here concerned , is provided  by a writer  who  rejects
it : Gareth  Evans. In his famous paper 
"
Things  without  the Mind ,
"3 Evans
explores  the  relationship  between  the  objectivity  of  experience  and the
spatiality  of  the  objects  of  experience  by  considering  the  situation  of  an
abstract subject  of  auditory  experience  (
" Hero "
) and asking what  needs
to  be made available to  such a subject  for  him  to  conclude  legitimately
that  his experience  is of spatially  located  sounds. At  one point  in  his discussion 
Evans writes  as follows :
If the hypothetical theory is to follow ours at all closely , sounds  would have  to be
occupy  space , and not merely be located in it, so that the notions of force and impenetrability 
would  somehow have to  have a place , and we may well  wonder
whether we can make  sense  of this without  providing Hero with an impenetrable
body and allowing him to be an agent  in, and manipulator of, his world. But perhaps 
this is the wrong line to pursue."
Despite Evans's dismissal, it  is this line  that I want  to pursue here.  Whereas
Evans raises  this option  in the context  of his discussion of the Kantian  theme
of  the  relationship  between  objectivity  and space , I  want  to  consider  the
matter in a different  context . For whether  or not space  is a necessary  feature
of objective  experience, the fact that some feature of experience  is experienced 
as  located in space  is certainly  not sufficient for its putative objectivity ,
because  such sensations  as pains are experienced  as located within  the sub-
ject
's body  (or, in  a few  abnormal  cases , in  its immediate  proximity ), yet
pains are not themselves objective features of the subject
's body, items whose
existence is independent  of the subject
's experience of them . But if one does
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2  Objects  as Causesnot rely on the spatiality of the objects of objective  experience to provide  a
context  for a discussion of the relationship  between objectivity  and agency,
then some other point  of entry  is required.  As my title  implies, I suggest  that
considerations of causality provide one. My  general line of argument will  be
(1) that  to  take oneself to  have objective  experience, one  needs to  accept
that the objects of experience are among its causes , and (2) that only  the experience 
of agency makes available to us the notorious  idea of  a necessary
connection , which  is an essential component  of  the  concept  of  causality.
Both  these points obviously  need considerable elaboration and defense.
There  are, I think , two  ways of arguing  for  the first point , concerning
the dependence of objectivity  on causality. One is suggested  by Kant's argument 
in the second Analogy  in  The Critique of Pure Reason  (1787). Kant  has
already argued (in the Transcendental Deduction ) that the possibility  of objective 
experience  depends upon  the "
unity
" of consciousness , by which  he
seems  to mean the ability  of a subject to refer his experiences to himself in
a coherent way as  experiences of an objective  world . His next move (in the
Schematism) is to  maintain  that  for  us, at least, this abstract unity  of  consciousness 
takes the  form  of  a temporally  ordered  stream of  experience .
But , Kant argues in the second Analogy, time  itself cannot  be perceived, so
the  temporal  ordering  of  experience  requires some other  basis , and Kant
argues that this is provided  by awareness  of the causal  order of the objects of
experience . Hence, to take oneself to  have objective  experience , one must
take oneself to have experience of objects whose causal  relationships enable
one to fix the temporal  order of one's experiences.  Thus, for Kant, objectivity 
depends essentially on  awareness  of  causality. Admittedly , he seems to
think  of this causality as  obtaining  primarily  between the objects of experience
, but  he seems equally  committed  to  the  existence of  causal relations
between objects and our  experiences of them, since only  thus can he hope
to secure his thesis that "we must derive the subjective  succession  of apprehension 
from  the objective  sl4ccession  of appearances ."s
This  argument  is plainly  questionable  in  many ways, but  one can reinforce 
the latter  part of it , concerning  the link  between  time  and causality
, with  the  help  of  Mellor 's views  about  time .6 Suppose we  take  it , as
seems  reasonable, that the temporal  unity  of consciousness that Kant  has in
mind  is a stream of consciousness within  which  McTaggart
's  A-series temporal 
concepts (the indexical  concepts of the past, present, and future ) are
applicable.7  We can now  ask, in a Kantian  spirit , what  makes these A-series
judgments  possible, and  we  can introduce  here  Mellor 's plausible  thesis
that these indexical  A-series  judgments  draw on the nonindexical  B-series
temporal  ordering  of events as earlier than, or simultaneous  with , one another
. For changes in  truth  values of such A-series  judgments  as  'It  is now
110 Thomas  BaldwinObjectivity , Callsality, and  A,~ency
raining
' reflect  the fact that their  truth  conditions  are determined  both  by
the  state of  the  world  and by  the  nonindexical  temporal  context  of  the
judgments . Thus , without  seeking to  reduce the A-series concepts  to  the
B-series ones, it  is plausible  to  suppose that  the A-series temporal  order
depends on the B-series order. And  if we ask further  what  determines  the
direction  of time , the direction  from  earlier to later, the obvious  answer is
causality: causes  precede their  effects. So, under  this reconstruction , awareness 
of the A-series temporal  order of experience  depends on awareness  of
the  B-series context  of  these experiences, and  this  in  turn  depends on
awareness  of the causal order of these experiences and other  events, which
is roughly  where  Kant 's argument  ends up. Admittedly , this still  leaves unexamined 
the first part of Kant 's argument , which  concerned  the connection 
between  the  possibility  of  objective  experience  and  the  temporal
unity  of  consciousness, but  this  is not  the  occasion  to  discuss this  claim
which , though  contentious , seems to me defensible.
Instead, I  want  to  present a different , and rather  less metaphysically
demanding , line  of  argument  for  the  thesis that  the self-ascription  of  objective 
experience  depends on  recognition  that  the objects of  experience
are among  their  causes .  This  argument  proceeds altogether  more  directly ,
starting  from  the  conception  of  objective  experience  as experience  of
objects  (or  events)  whose  existence  is independent  of  the  experience  of
them . Now  the  naive  phenomenology  of  perception , especially  vision ,
may tempt  us to  think  of  this  as altogether  unproblematic . For  the  naive
realist builds the objectivity  of experience  into  the conception  of the content 
of experience  itself by thinking  of experience  as the "
transparent
" or
"
diaphanous
" awareness  of objects, so that experience  is conceived  of as a
relationship  with  objects that present themselves to us  just  as they are.H  But
a moment 's reflection  reveals to us that this conception  really is too  naive:
the contents  of experience just  do not  cohere in a way that permits  us to
regard them  all as objective  qualities  of objects independent  of us. Hence ,
the  objectivity  of  an experience  cannot  in  general  be something  that  is
just  given  unproblematically  within  the  content  of  the  experience  itself;
some further  feature that  implies  this objectivity  needs to  be introduced ,
and the causal thesis is that recognition  of the causal dependence of an experience 
on  its object  provides  this  feature, so that  the  self-ascription  of
objective  experience  requires that  experience  should  itself  furnish  a basis
for  the recognition  of this causal dependence.  The  idea is that since experience 
in fact gets its objective  relational  structure  from  its causal relationship 
with  those objects in  the world  that  fit  its apparent content , subjects
who  think  of themselves as  subjects of objective  experience  must have reason 
to think  that their  experiences are caused by their  objects.My  claim, therefore, is that  we  can make sense of  the  objectivity  of
our  own  experiences only  in  the context  of a folk  psychology  of  perception 
that  includes  the causal thesis. It  is obvious  that  anyone who  accepts
that the objects of their  experience  have a causal role in the genesis of their
experience  thereby  treats their  experience  as objective ; what  needs more
argument  is the  converse claim , that  belief  in  objectivity  requires  acceptance 
of a causal role for  the objects of experience . The  reason this is so is
that to divorce  belief in the objectivity  of one's experience  from  the causal
thesis would  be to  hold  that  one's identification  of  the objects of  experience 
does not  contribute  to  one's understanding  of  why  one's experience
is as  it is. But  once the objects of perception  are considered not  to play any
explanatory  role in perception  itself, we are thrown  back to Male   branch   e's
occasionalism or something  similar, and, as Locke observed, our  reason for
belief  in  the objectivity  of  experience  is then  radically  undermined .9 For
if, as the denial of any causal role to the objects of experience  implies , one
supposes  that one's actual experience  could  have been just  as it was even if
its apparent objects had not  existed at all, one makes it  quite  unclear why
one  is entitled  to  hold  that  the  content  of  that  experience  provides  any
reason for  supposing that things are in  some respects as they appear to be.
We have reason to take our perceptions to be objective  only  where we find
that their  supposed objects, combined  with  an understanding  of our  sense
organs and situation , yield  an explanation  of the content  of the perception
itself. No  deep understanding  of sensory psychology  is required  here: only
common  sense  folk  psychology  is assumed. But  we manifest our  awareness
of this all the time  in our  investigative activities , for such activities  are precisely 
attempts to  arrange our  situation  so that  the  content  of experience
will  show  us how  things  are, because our  situation , we believe, will  yield
experience  whose content  is explained  by its being veridical .
This , then, completes  the second line  of argument  for  the thesis that
objectivity  implies  causality, that  by thinking  of  one's experiences  as objective
, one is committed  to thinking  of their  objects are their  causes , or at
any rate as contributing  to a causal understanding  of  the experience .  This
is, in  turn , just  the  first  leg in  the broader  thesis I  am proposing : that  ascribing 
objectivity  to one's own  experience  implies  experience  of oneself
as an agent. So now  I  turn  to  the  second leg, the  connection  between  a
grasp of causality and experience  of agency.
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3  Bodily  Power
This  is an old  thesis with  both  a negative and a positive  component . The
negative component  is that our sense  experiences do not by themselvesen-Causal  it~
It  is, of course, Hume  who  provides a classic formulation  of the negative 
component  of  this  line  of  thought . He  places special emphasis on
the modal implications  of causal thoughts  (their  connections  with  ideas of
necessity and power) and asks how  the course of experience  can reveal to
us not  only  what  is the case but  also what  has to  be case , what  could  not
be otherwise .  I I One  familiar  response to this argument  is to appeal to  our
experience  of  the  resistance  of  things, e.g., my  experience  now  as I  press
against the table. For, some have said, does not this give us an experience  of
impossibility and therefore  provide  us with  a way into  the  circle  of  modal
concepts? I suspect this is what  Dr .  Johnson had in  mind  when , according
to Boswell, he sought to refute Berkeley (whose views about natural causality 
are similar  to Hume 's) by reminding  us of what  it is like  to kick  a rock .
Hume  himself acknowledged  this line of thought , writing , 
" It may be pretended
, that the resistance which  we meet with  in  bodies, obliging  us frequently 
to exert our force, and call up all our power, this gives us the idea of
force and power. It  is this nisus , or strong endeavour, of which  we are conscious
, that  is the  original  impression  from  which  this  idea is copied ." 12
Hume  rejects this proposal because it is not  universally  applicable and does
not  provide  us with  an a priori  concept  of power.  These objections  do not
seem altogether  to the point , but  there is a better  critical  discussion of this
proposal by  Heidegger  in  a discussion of  Max  Scheler's presentation  of  a
version  of  it.13  Heidegger  argues that  the  familiar  tactile  and kinesthetic
sensations that we interpret  as evidence of the resistance of things bear this
interpretation , and thus the  crucial  modal  interpretation  as experience  of
impossibility , only  because we conceptualize  them  from  a perspective that
includes the thought  that they occur  in the context  of an attempt  to effect
some physical  change  in  the  world . So the  experience  is interpreted  as
experience  of  resistance only  within  a perspective  that  already  includes
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able us to  discriminate  causal connections  among  perceived  objects  from
bare spatiotemporal  conjunctions .  The positive component  is that the expenence 
of our  own  agency gives us a distinct  idea of causal connection  and
enables us to see how  this applies within  the world . Locke provides a classic
formulation  of these two  components :
But yet, if we will  consider  it attentively , Bodies, by our Senses , do not afford us so
clear and distinct an Idea  of active  power , as  we have  from reflection on the Operations 
of our Minds. . . . Neither have  we from Body any Idea  of the beginning of
Motion .  A Body at rest  affords  us no Idea  of any active  Power  to move; and when it
is set in  motion  it  self, that  Motion  is rather a Passion , than an Action  in
it. . . . The Idea  of the beginning of motion, we have  only from reflection on what
passes  in our selves , where we find by Experience , that barely by willing  it, . . . we
can move the parts  of our Bodies , which were before at rest.  IIIthe concept of causation. If this perspective is not assumed, then the experience 
yields no more  than a peculiar  type of sensation conjoined  with  certain 
bodily  movements. Hence, to  use experienced  resistance to  challenge
the  negative  component  of  Locke's argument , we  have already to  accept
something  like  the positive  component  of  his argument : that our  grasp of
causation is founded  on our experience  of bodily  action .
This  positive component  is, of course, challenged by Hume , who  objects 
that the idea of causation cannot be founded  on our experience of our
own agency.  According  to Hume , this experience is shrouded in mystery: we
understand all too little  of the mechanism of action, of the way in which  our
thoughts give rise to movements of our bodies.  Thus, so far from  this experience 
yielding  us an example from  which  we might  gain a clear and distinct
conception  of causal power, we find  nothing  but  the conjunction  of acts of
will  with  the motion  of certain parts of our body :  "We learn the influence  of
our  will  from  experience  alone. And  experience  only  teaches us, how  one
event constantly  follows  another; without  instructing  us in  the secret connexion
, which  binds them together, and renders them inseparable." 14  So the
appeal to the experience of agency, which  forms the positive component  of
Locke's account of our grasp of the idea of active power, or causation, is, according 
to Hume , entirely  mistaken.
One  part of the response to Hume  must be that the account  he offers
of  agency is not  tenable. For  Hume , agency is constituted  by  a constant
conjunction  of mental acts of an appropriate  type (acts of will ) with  bodily
movements, and this constant conjunction  can then  be interpreted , in  the
light  of   Hume 's projective  theory  of causation, as a causal relationship .  The
objection  to  this  is that  physical  action  is not  simply  bodily  movement
caused by a purely  mental  act that "wills " some worldly  end. For this account 
misconstrues  the  relation  between  acts of  will  and  bodily  movement
; it  is not just  a conjunction  worth  noting  for  future  reference  (like
that, say , between  consumption  of  too  much  alcohol  and  a subsequent
hangover), since the  intentionality  of  the  mental  act is transmitted  to  the
bodily  movement  itself.  The  Humean  account , which  treats acts of will  as
exclusively  mental, makes it  seem that  I raise my arm just  by engaging  in
an appropriate  mental  act and then waiting  for  the result of that act. But  I
can, in Hume 's sense , 
"will " as hard as I like  that my arm should  rise without 
anything  happening ,just  as I can will  that the sun should  shine without 
anything  happening . To  come  closer  to  the  experience  of  agency,
therefore , we require  an account  in  which  bodily  movement  is integrated
into  the act of will  itself so that  in cases  of successful action  an act of will
becomes bodily .
The kind  of account that is wanted has, I think , been provided by Brian
O ' 
Shaughnessy .  IS Here I will  not  attempt  a description  of O' 
Shaughnessy
's
114 Thomas  BaldwinThe  significance  of this conception  of " the having  of power  or  control 
over the limb " is that  it  implies  that  once one replaces the volitionist
account  of action  that Hume  invokes, his objections  to the Lockean thesis
about  the relationship  between  the  experience  of  agency and the  idea of
power  can be set aside. For O' 
Shaughnessy
's account  of action  implies  that
the  experience  of  agency includes  the  experience  of  bodily  powers, defined 
by the psychophysical dispositions  that link  the will  to bodily  movements
. The  experience  of  agency is, therefore , not  one of  acts of  will  just
regularly, but  mysteriously , conjoined  with  bodily  movements; it  is one of
acts of will  that extend  themselves to those parts of the body  that are under 
direct  control  of the agent.
A Humean  might  still object  that it remains to be shown that we have
reason to think  that we are agents with  bodily  powers. Indeed, he might  at
this point  seek to  recruit  O ' 
Shaughnessy to  his own  side, for  O ' 
Shaugh-
nessy shows that illusion  is as possible with  respect to one's own  agency as
with  respect to  ordinary  perception , by  describing  a case in  which  an
agent thinks  he is performing  a very  simple  arm  movement  that  requires
no effort  when  in fact his arm is being  moved by a machine  that goes into
action  just  when  the  agent thinks  he is starting  to  move  his arm .  IS But
recognition  of  this  kind  of  possibility  of  error  need  not  undermine  the
idea that the coherence  of our  experience  provides us with  good  enough
reason to hold  that we are normally  reliable in  this respect.  The  thesis that
it is through  the experience  of agency that we get a grasp of bodily  power,
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account. But one central point  is the conception  of an attempt, or a striving ,
which , although  definitely  psychological  at the moment  of  inceptionen -
compass  es those subsequent bodily  consequences  that are directly  under the
agent
's control .  Thus my raising my arm is a successful  attempt on my part to
raise my arm; the attempt comes to "fruition " 
through  the movement  of the
limb .16  Furthermore , the experience  of  agency is precisely the experience
of  such attempts coming  to  fruition  through  the  agent
's control  of  bodily
movement : the agent experiences the psychophysical unity  of bodily  action
through  experience of satisfaction of a set of conditionals  connecting  choice
and movement . O' 
Shaughnessy  writes ,
I refer to the obtaining of a set  of conditionals, which are  such  as  to ensure  the existence 
of a power . For the normal human agent can when he chooses  stop the
movement  of his arm, . . . and he can when he chooses  change  the direction of its
movement, . . . and he can speed  up or slow or whatever . Now  these  properties ,
summed up in the concept of the  having  of power  or control  over  the limb, are of absolutely 
central importance to the occurrence  of a physical  act of movement-making
. . . . Herewith, a dialectical synthesis  of  the seemingly opposed bodily  and
psycho -physical  requirements  of physical  action is effected .  I?116 Tllomas  Baldwin
and thus of causation, does not  require  infallibility  with  respect to our  experience 
of agency.
Yet what  remains to be clarified  is the way in  which  the experience
of  bodily  power  enters  into  the  constitution  of  objective  experience .
Schopenhauer provides, I think , a useful cautionary  example in this respect.
In some respects his account  of the will  anticipates that of O ' 
Shaughnessy .
Thus he writes ,
"
Only  in reflection  are willing  and acting different ; in reality 
they  are one. Every  true, genuine, immediate  act of  the  will  is also at
once and directly  a manifest act of  the body. My  body  is the  objectivity of
my  will ." 19 Furthermore ,  he  endorses a  version  of  the  Lockean  thesis
about  the  idea of  power  or  force: " Hitherto , the  concept  of  will  has been
subsumed under  the concept  offorce; I, on  the other  hand, do \..xactly  the
reverse, and  intend  every  force  in  nature  to  be  conceived  of  as will ."2O
However , as this closing  comment  indicates, Schopenhauer  goes well  beyond 
a simple epistemological  grounding  of the concept  of force on experience 
of  will . He  harness  es his doctrine  of  force  as will  to  the  Kantian
conception  of  things-in-themselves, to  draw  the  conclusion  that  will  is
" the  innermost  essence , the  kernel , of  every  particular  thing  and also of
the whole . It appears in every blindly  acting force of nature, and also in the
deliberate  conduct  of man, and the great difference  between  the two  concerns 
only  the degree of the manifestation , not  the inner  nature of what  is
manifested."21  Exciting  though  this metaphysics sounds, what  we need is
an account that, by locating  the will  within  experience , puts limits  on it . In
grounding  the idea of causation on the will , we do not  want  to be drawn
to the conclusion  that all causation is willpower . For the will  itself is just  a
causal power.
In  outline , the  first  part  of  the  requisite  construction  appears fairly
straightforward . If  the experience  of  agency is the irreducible  experience
of bodily  power, then  the  way is clear for  the  experience  of  resistance to
bear the obvious  interpretation  in  terms of forces acting  upon  us to  place
limits  on our bodily  power. In brief , if the experience  of bodily  power is an
experience  of  possibilities , the  experience  of  resistance is the  experience
of impossibilities . Furthermore , since these impossibilities  are experienced
as  arising in the context  of bodily  contact , the ground  for these impossibil -
ities  can be (fallibly ) assumed to  be located  outside  the  body. Hence  the
idea of  external  forces constraining  us can be legitimated  within  experience
. Thus, given  the  modal  content  of  the  experience  of  agency, tactile
experience  itself  can be legitimately  assigned a content  in  which  modal
concepts  are used to  characterize  the  objects  of  experience ; in  this  way
Hume 's modal  challenge can be faced down , and the objectivity  of tactile
experience  vindicated .An  important  step has, however, been omitted  here in  that  the  objectivity 
of  tactile  experience  presupposes the  objectivity  of  the proprio -
ceptive body  sense that  informs  us of  our  limb  movements . For it  is only
because we  are able to  regard our  proprioceptive  sense as providing  us
with  putatively  objective  information  about our  limbs  that we can rely on
tactile  experience  to extend  objective  content  beyond  the body.22  On  the
basis of bodily  experience  one cannot  form  a conception  of the objective
physical  world  that  only  commences  beyond  the  limits  of  the  body : the
body  itself has to be included  within  that world , even though  our  experience 
of  the body  is quite  unlike  our  experience  of  the  rest of  the  world .
How , then, should the objectivity  of proprioception  itself be handled?  The
question  is strange because experience  is always in  some respect bodily , so
it  is not  at first  clear what  it  might  be for  one's own  body  to  exist unperceived
.  The  approach I have been following  implies  that the objectivity  of
proprioception , like  that of the other  senses , should  rest on a causal interpretation 
of  the  relationship  between  proprioceptive  experience  and  its
bodily  object . But  if , following  O ' 
Shaughnessy , we accept the irreducible
experience  of bodily  power as  fundamental , then the availability  of a causal
interpretation  of proprioception  is implied . For the experience  that some
current  limb  movement  is under  the control  of one's will  permits  one to
recognize that the experience  itself depends on the limb  movement . In my
awareness  that my arm is rising  becarise  I have chosen to raise it , there is implied 
a recognition  that  this  very  awareness itself  depends on  the  movement 
of  my  arm  (and thus on  my  will ). The  experience  of  agency as the
causal power of bodily  control  brings with  it the objectivity  of the body  as
a cause of this very experience .
What  needs more  discussion here is whether  the  availability  of  this
objective  information  concerning  limb  movement  does not  itself depend
to some extent  on tactile  experience  to provide  an objective  spatial framework 
of the subject
's body  (a body  image) within  which  the propriocep -
tive sense  then locates the subject
's limbs .  This  claim  has been advanced by
O ' 
Shaughnessy ,23  and it  poses a threat to  the thesis that  the objectivity  of
the  contents  of  tactile  experience  is grounded  in  the  objectivity  of  the
proprioceptive  body  sense . In response to O ' 
Shaughnessy , however, I want
to urge that the body  image has a recursive structure .  At  the primitive  level
of infancy, I suggest, the body  image has a crude spatial structure  given entirely 
by proprioception .  This  gives the infant  a simple sense  of agency and
bodily  power that enables it to employ  its sense  of touch  to explore  its own
body  and, on  the  basis of  these explorations , enrich  its body  image, and
thus the content  of its proprioceptions , and so on. This  recursive model  of
the  successive enrichment  of  the  body  image through  the  sense of  touch
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preserves the plausible part of O ' 
Shaughnessy
's thesis that the normal  adult
body  image has a degree of spatial articulation  that cannot be derived from
proprioception  alone, yet retains the  thesis that, at the  most  fundamental
level, proprioception  does not  depend on touch .
The  difficult  part  in  the story  is the  next : how  is one  to  vindicate  a
causal understanding  of  the  content  of  other  modalities  of  sense experience 
(e.g., hearing  and sight), and thus their  objectivity ?  They  do not  include 
the experience  of the resistance of their  objects, so the ascription  of
causal powers to  such objects, and a causal comprehension  of our  experience 
of  them , cannot  just  follow  the  pattern  of  tactile  experience . Not
surprisingly , these are the senses  that  we think  of  when  we think  of  perception 
as  just  a matter  of  passive receptivity . One  obvious  route  here is
to build  out  from  the objectivity  of touch  via the thought  that the objects
of  touch  are usually  a. lso potential  objects  of  sight, hearing , etc. By  itself
this will  not  give a causal understanding  of the role of these objects in, say ,
auditory  experience  of  the  kind  that  tactile  experience  makes available.
But  we need not  think  of causes  as forces that we can feel, as if  we had to
be able to feel sound waves striking  our  ears and making  the inner  ear vibrate 
in order  to vindicate  the objectivity  of auditory  experience . Instead,
we can think  of causes  as the grounds of dispositions , so that, as long  as we
can attain  a dispositional  understanding  of  auditory  experience  that  ties
the experience  counterfactually  to  the audible  presence of  some tangible
sound source, the conclusion  that  the source of the sound  is the  cause of
the experience  can be fairly  drawn .  Admittedly , this line of thought  takes it
for  granted  that  the  objects  of  touch  are also potential  objects  of  sight,
hearing , and so on. But  this assumption is readily defensible: it rests on our
awareness that  there  is just  one  space because of  the  single  bodily  point
of origin  of  the spaces  of  the. different  senses . Because bodily  experience
locates one's sense organs within  a single body  space , the sense fields that
open out  from  the different  sense  organs are experienced  as different  ways
of perceiving  one and the same space .
Is it right  to assign this degree of priority  to the sense  of touch  in the
constitution  of objectivity ? Do  the other  senses  have to build  out  from  the
conception  of the objects of experience  given by touch ?  There  is certainly
an intuitive  inclination  to judge  that things are real only  when we can touch
them : Macbeth , confronted  by  the  vision  of  a dagger, reaches forward  to
clutch  it  and, finding  nothing  tangible  there, concludes  that  it  is just 
"a
dagger of the mind ." But  there are plenty  of real visible objects that are not
tangible , such as smoke, so tangibility  is certainly  no  necessary condition
of physical reality. But  this is not  the issue; what  is in  question  is whether
the sense  of touch  should have the priority  that this line of thought  assignsto it. Indeed, although  the line  of argument  is primarily  epistemological , it
lends itself readily to a developmental  interpretation  and can thus be taken
to  support  the  empirical  priority  of  bodily  experience  and touch  in  the
constitution  of a child 's conception  of the physical world .  Yet once the role
of  counterfactual  thought  within  nontactile  experience  is acknowledged ,
it  may appear unnecessary to  suppose that  the other  senses  need to  build
out  from  a conception  of  objectivity  that  is grounded  in  bodily  experience 
and the sense  of touch .
The  case  of Ian Waterman , which  Jonathan Cole  has described in fascinating 
detail, provides a way of making  this challenge  especially vivid .2~
Despite lacking  normal  proprioception  and sense  of touch  (though  he still
retains  sensitivity  to  temperature ), Ian Waterman  can  employ  his  other
senses  much  as we do. Indeed, he relies on  visual feedback to  control  his
body. And  although  Waterman  is confident  that he is drawing  on the mastery 
of  his full  perceptual  capacities that  he enjoyed prior  to  the illness at
the  age of  19 that  deprived  him  of  proprioception  and touch ,25  it  is not
easy to  be  confident  that  this  is an essential feature  of  any similar  case .
Could  there  not  be someone  who  was struck  by the  same illness during
early  infancy  and yet  managed to  develop  abilities  comparable  to  those
that Waterman  developed? Such a case would  be astonishing , yet Water-
man's achievements, which  far  exceeded  the  expectations  of  those  who
first treated him , are themselves astonishing and must give pause to anyone
who  assigns a fundamental  role  in  the  constitution  of  objectivity  to  the
sense  of touch  and bodily  experience .
I  think  Waterman 's case and hypothetical  extensions of  it  show  that
there must be an alternative to the normal , intuitively  accessible  route to the
constitution  of  the  objectivity  of  experience  that  passes  through  proprio -
ception  and the sense  of touch . On  this alternative route, the modal component 
of the causal role of objects of experience  will  be manifested through
. subjects
' 
acceptance of  counterfactuals  linking  the  presence of  objects  in
their environment  to the condition  of their sense  organs and the contents of
their  experience. Now  it  is not  difficult  to  imagine  courses of  experience
rich  enough  to  make explanatory  hypotheses of  this  kind  reasonable if  a
general framework  of causal  explanation  can be assumed .26  But  the issues  in
the present context  are whether  this can be assumed without  begging  the
question  and  whether  this  alternative  route  shows that  the  eMphasis on
agency that I have been exploring  is after all in principle  dispensable.
I suggest that this second conclusion  does not  follow , for  reasons that
connect  with  the need to confront  the first issue.  To suppose that agency is
altogether  dispensable is to  revert  to  the model  of  the passive interpreter ,
and in support  of this it may be said that the visual systems of humans and
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to be progressively interpreted  as  experience  of a physical world  that is
spatially organized  from  the subject
's point  of view  without  any reference
to  the subject
's agency. Hence, one  might  argue, neither  from  adevelop -
mental, nor  from  an epistemological , point  of view  is agency really necessary
. Now  I am not  competent  to  adjudge  the  developmental  issue here,
but  the necessity for  some degree of  agency is strongly  supported  by the
famous experiment  by Held  and Hein  in which  kittens  that had been rendered 
unable from  birth  to move themselves (although  they were passively
carried  around  in  circles by other  kittens) were unable to develop  normal
spatial vision .27  This  experiment  suggests that  full  three-dimensional  spatial 
experience  indeed  requires  physical  agency, the  capacity  to  explore
space and relate visual  experience  to  bodily  experience . But  Waterman -
type cases  suggest the need for  some caution  here (especially if one imagines 
such  a case combined  with  paralysis of  much  of  the  body), and  I
would  like to propose that a more modest degree of agency may in principle 
suffice, namely voluntary  control  of the sense  organs.
Despite  his lack of proprioception , Ian Waterman  can turn  and focus
his eyes, and indeed he relies on visual feedback to control  his limb  movements
, but  whether  he or  any hypothetical  variant  of  his case could  con-
trollimb  movement  ifhe  were blind  is doubtful . I suggest that this kind  of
voluntary  control  of the sense  organs is essential. One  reason for this is that
in  assigning an objective  content  to  visual  experience , the  subject  has to
take account of his point  of view  and the condition  of his eyes. If these are
to some extent  under voluntary  control , the subject can factor  them  out  in
interpreting  his experience  and identify  the objects distinctively  responsible 
for  his current  experience . A  subject  who  lacks this degree of  voluntary 
control  would  not  be in  a position  to  control , and thus identify , the
variables that  determine  visual  experience , and  thus  he  would  never  be
able to solve the "simultaneous equations
" that experience  presents. It may
be objected  that this point  depends on  taking  the interpretation  of  visual
input  as altogether  too  much  a matter  of  conscious  reasoning; once  it  is
recognized  that  this interpretation  is carried  out  primarily  by subsystems
over which  we have no control , it may be said, this argument  for  the need
for control  over the sense  organs is undermined . In response  to this, I would
say that even though , of course, the interpretation  of visual input  is carried
out  largely by subsystems  over which  we have no control , it remains to be
shown  that  the  programming  of  these subsystems does not  depend  on
learning  and feedback that assume  a capacity for  voluntary  controlSome -
one with  no voluntary  control  over his eyes  would  lack the ability  to focus
his attention  on  specific  regions  of  the  visual  field ; hence he would  lack
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to stabilize his visual identification  of objects while  his own  point  of view
alters.  Without  these abilities , which  have a fundamental  role in  the organization 
of  the visual field , I strongly  doubt  whether  any objective  interpretation 
of visual experience  could  be sustained.
This  line  of  thought  can be reinforced  by considerations  that  return
to  my  earlier  stress  on  the modal  component  of objective  experience . By
finding  that some aspects  of the content  of visual experience , unlike  its direction
, are not subject to the will , a subject encounters  a kind  of impossibility 
within  visual experience  (a visual analogue of tactile  resistance) and
is thus led to  think  that  the  content  concerns  objects  whose  existence is
independent  of the experience  and can therefore  be employed  to  explain
the  experience . Yet  one  can  only  encounter  this  kind  of  impossibility
within  a context  in which  other  changes are experienced  as possible. Ifwe
imagine  that  Ian Waterman  lacks voluntary  control  of his eyes, and thus is
altogether  passive in  relation  to  the  course  of  his  visual  experience , no
changes in the course of his experience  would  be experienced  as more  or
less  possible than any other , so not  only  would  there be insuperable problems 
in factoring  out  the contribution  to the content  of experience  made
by its objects, there would  also be deeper questions as to why  such a subject 
should imagine  that his experience  is experience  of objects whose existence 
is independent  of him . Nothing  in the experience  of such a subject
would  warrant  the  assumption  that  one  can extract  from  the  content  of
experience  the materials for a causal explanation  of it .
There  is  more  to  be  said concerning  the  phenomenology  of  Ian
Waterman 's situation  and other  more  extreme  cases  that  might  beimag -
ined  or  discovered.  Yet I hope  that  I have said enough  to  show that  these
cases  do  not  provide  decisive counterexamples  to  my  thesis that  agency
helps  to  constitute  objectivity , although  they  do  show  that  one  should
qualify  any assignment of  priority  to  proprioception  and  touch . Rather
than prolong  direct  discussion of this issue, however, I want  finally  to turn
to  the  metaquestion  of  how  this  whole  second line  of  argument  for  the
first-person thesis that objective  experience  depends on the experience  of
agency relates to the third -person thesis that perception  implies  agency.
4  The  Harmony  Requirement
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The  first argument  tells me that  I cannot suppose myself to  enjoy  perceptions 
of an objective  world  without  supposing myself to  be an agent. Isn't
this just  the  conclusion  of  the  second argument? If  so, wherein  lies the
point  of that argument? Its rationale must derive from  its distinctive  startingpoint : the abstract conception  of  oneself as a subject of  experience , wondering 
what  kind  of assumptions about oneself and one's experience  warrant 
belief in the objectivity  of experience . For from  this starting point , the
first line  of argument , with  its essential third -person perspective, is unavailable
, or  at any rate question-begging, as this  line  of  argument  takes it  for
granted that one is a subject within  an objective  world  that includes other
subjects, and that the kind  of connections  that apply in general among perception
, belief , and agency apply in one's own  case .  The  first argument  does
not  aim to establish the presuppositions of rational  belief  in the objectivity
of  experience ; it just  concerns  the  connections  among  perception , belief ,
and agency, where these are conceived as states  of beings whose objectivity
is simply  not  in question . Now  there is nothing  wrong  with  this line  ofar -
gument . But  the  second argument  starts from  a point  of  view  that  has
bracketed such assumptions and, with  correspondingly  less  material  to draw
on, seeks  to draw out  the presuppositions of assigning a distinctively  objec-
.  ,  .
tlve content  to one sown  experIence.
As indicated  by the use of the idioms  of '
legitimation
'
, 
'warrant '
, and
'constitution ' 
throughout  the second argument , the  concern  of  this argument 
is fundamentally  epistemological .  The  argument  is not , however, pri -
marily  antiskeptical; instead  its  concern  is  transcendental: the  argument
seeks to show  that agency is a necessary condition  for  the legitimate  selfascription 
of objective  perception , and because it is of this kind , the episte-
mo   logical  considerations  readily  connect  with  developmental  ones, as the
final  stages of  my  discussion indicate . The  epistemology  involved  here  is
distinctively 
"internalist ,
"28  for  it  adopts a first-person point  of  view  from
the outset and explores the lines of reasoning available to a subject of experience 
who  seeks  to explore  the basis of his belief  in  the objectivity  of his
own  experience . Internalist  epistemology  of this kind  is currently  out of favor
, but I myself think  that it is a proper part of the traditional  philosophical
enterprize  of gaining  a reflective  understanding  of ourselves and our  place
within  the world . I will  not  attempt  here to defend this claim, but  in  a full
defense I would  want to acknowledge  that this kind  of epistemology  needs
to be completed  by an externalist  epistemology, which  confirms , from  the
outside, so to speak, the conception  of our  cognitive  relation  to  the world
that the internalist  argument implies .29  If this is right , it follows  that the two
arguments I have been discussing are not  altogether  alien to each other  after 
all, for the first argument  can be regarded as  an externalist  confirmation
of  the  conclusion  of  the ~econd  one. On  refle.ction, this should  not  seem
surprising;-for  if  one were to  suppose (contrary  to  my  argument) that  the
legitimation  of  the  objectivity  of  one's perceptual  experience  did  not  require 
a conception  of oneself as  an agent, it would  seem altogether mysteri -
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ous if , in thinking  of oneself from  a third -person point  of view  as a subject
of  objective  perceptions, one  was nonetheless committed  to  thinking  of
oneself as an agent. In such a frame of mind  one would  seem compel led to
adopt a Sartrean division  of the self into  one's being-for-oneself and one's
being-for-others.30  Since such an outcome  can only  be regarded as a re-
ductio  ad absurd   um of the assumed  combination  of positions here, it is reasonable 
to require that the approach   es of the first and second arguments be
in harmony, and since the first argument  appears hard to fault , this requirement 
of  harmony  helps to  confirm  at least the conclusion  of  the  second,
more contentious , line of argument .
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